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This research is an application of the econometric price series to the analysis of dairy chain 
efficiency in Italy. At a theoretic level, the price transmission and asymmetry in the speed of 
adjustment to positive and negative price changes is supported by the Industrial 
Organization, multi market equilibrium, food chain theories. However this does not provide a 
clear signal of competitiveness as many conditions may induce stickiness (curvature of 
demand, local cost and externalities, long term contracts,. While evidences from past EU 
studies about the dairy sector are mixed, several studies have demonstrated the evidence of 
price asymmetries in different market contests. The aim of this research is to examine the 
price dynamics along the dairy chain and offer some empirical evidences about the 
cointegration and asymmetric price transmission at different market levels. The parametric 
test of asymmetry in a multivariate VECM (vector error correction term), suggests symmetry 
in co-movement. To explore in deeper whether these results are robust with respect to 
nonlinearity it is estimated the threshold VECM model; the results suggest to reject the 
hypothesis of asymmetry with exception for the raw milk and wholesale butter. While market 
competitiveness can not be inferred only from evidence of asymmetry, these findings 
support the hypothesis that the market structure and policy in the Italian dairy chain didn’t 
affect greatly the price asymmetry. However, for the butter market, the public intervention 
seems to have generated speculative behavior among the operators and generated 
asymmetric price responses to positive/negative price changes.   
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During recent decades a number of sector policies targeted the Milk Market Organization 
(CMO) in the EU; a short summary of these interventions includes the introduction of the 
quotas regime (1984), the Mac Sharry reform (1992) which moved the CAP toward income 
support through compensatory direct payment allowing a reduction in the guarantee prices. 
Other political interventions were included in Agenda 2000 with specific milk sector measures 
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(May 1999), the Fischler’s package reform (2003), the de-coupled single payment (2005 and 
2007), the Milk Package (2009), and finally the quota release (2015). The purpose of these 
measures was to strengthen the dairy chain competitiveness by dismantling the CMO and 
accelerating the structural changes, to adapt the dairy sector to a complete market 
liberalization. The main structural changes were: a substantial exit of a considerable number 
of milk producers, leaving behind production operations with larger scale, higher yield and 
lower costs. At the processing level, the concentration and M&A operations were 
strengthening the market power of some industrial groups (i.e. Granarolo, Lactalis); at the 
retail level, product differentiation and private labeling increased the retailers’ market power 
(Rosa et al., 2015). In general, these changes may have biased the power distribution along 
the chain with consequences for margin and profit distribution among participants 
(Cavicchioli, 2010). However, other factors could have been responsible of the price setting 
through the chain, with the increase in horizontal and vertical relationships among agents 
across EU countries. (Bonnet et al., 2015; Serra and Goodwin, 2003; Weaver and Natcher, 
1999). These considerations suggest that the pass-through may be market specific: raw milk 
cost shocks are under transmitted through the dairy chain and over transmitted on the fluid 
market (Bonnet et al., 2015). It is our interest to evaluate how the dairy chain responded to 
the evolving policy and structural setting (Rosa et al, 2013), by  examining the empirical 
evidence of vertical price transmission. Such an evaluation faces two substantial constraints: 
first, as the policy changes starting with the Fisher package followed throughout the ensuing 
decades and second the time at which such policy changes became effective is germane yet 
not specifiable. These premises prevent a direct evaluation on specific changes in dairy 
policy and their impact on market efficiency. It is asseverated that for vertically integrated 
and efficient markets operating under perfect information and zero transactions costs, the 
prices would be co-integrated by the effective arbitrage. This condition implies that a change 
on market condition at one stage of the chain would cause instantaneous adjustment along 
the other steps of the dairy chain. Being the price the primary signal of market equilibrium, 
the instantaneous price transmission (adjustment) is intended as an evidence of market 
efficient conditions and has important consequences for the pricing practices (Bonnet, 1994). 
In a fast moving transparent, competitive market environment, the exogenous shocks, 
including policy changes are transmitted through the market chain by traditional arbitrage as 
suggested by the derived demand model (Tomek and Robinson, 1972). This transmission is 
driven by producer imperatives to seek profits and avoid losses; as this involves structural 
adaptation, it is useful to label its vertical structure arbitrage (Wohlgenant, 2001). Compared 
to intertemporal and spatial arbitrage, vertical structural arbitrage is likely to be more time 
intensive and requires changes in product practices, marketing relationships and other 
adaptive investments. Further on the impact side, such restructuring requires the 
establishment of a new procurement arrangements to fulfill associated changes in derived 
demand. Given structural differences in output and input adaptation, some authors have 
hypothesized that the long run relationship between prices may be asymmetric among 
vertical market stages. This conjecture is supported by a rather thin literature (Ward, 1982; 
Kinnukan and Forker, 1987; Boyd & Brorsen, 1988, Vavra and Goodwin, 2005; Weaver and 
Natcher, 1999; Santeramo, 2015). However, the alternative null hypothesis of market 
efficiency includes a number of other market conditions some consistent with competitive 
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markets, while others are consistent with imperfect competition. Menu costs or fixed costs, 
inventory costs (e.g. perishability, see Ward, 1982); accounting methods (Balke et al. 1998; 
Blinder, 1982), production costs of adjustment (Peltzman, 2000; Bailey and Brorsen, 1989), 
and policy intervention (Kinnucan & Forker, 1987) have been considered to be responsible of 
asymmetric response to price changes under competitive conditions. Other researches have 
suggest that price changes tend to flow from farm to wholesale and retail while the reverse 
is not so evident. Clearly, when the market involves oligopoly, the price transmission may 
also be found to be asymmetric (Rosa, 2015). Others suggest that the presence of oligopoly  
and oligopsony power does not necessarily reflect imperfect price transmission and noted 
that the functional form of the retail demand and farm input supply are the key factors in 
determining the extent and speed of price transmission (Weldegebriel,2004). Empirically, the 
problem of extracting information about market power from price time series is challenged 
by the complexity of the market systems. (Rosa, Weaver and Vasciaveo, 2014). At best, 
where price transmission takes time, is sluggish, and appears to be strongly asymmetric, we 
can suggest that imperfections in competition affect the market efficient conditions. 
Empirically, a number of issues further challenge our ability to evaluate the impacts of policy 
changes on competitiveness based on time series data. First, as multiple changes in 
economic conditions evolve over time, a unique, exogenous treatment due to policy can not 
be identified. Peltzman (2000) has tested this situation by using cross section data. Second, 
within time series specification, a number of details are left unsolved by economic theory 
and results change depending on the resolution method. Given these observed structural 
changes following CMO reform, it is of interest to examine the evolving market condition 
during the last period of milk quota life. A limited, though critical topic is offered by 
consideration of price transmission within the vertical supply chain within the dairy sector. 
Specific focus on the EU vertical dairy chain has been taken by the London Economics 
(2003); this study has considered a group of EU countries: UK, Germany, France and 
Denmark and has found evidence of imperfect, asymmetric transmission in each country. 
OECD (2004) has considered dairy sector reform effects across the EU using the OECD 
Secretariat’s Aglink and PEM models to evaluate the implications of individual policy 
measures related to quota systems and price support for production, consumption, trade, 
prices, income and welfare. This report suggests the reforms would lift producer prices and 
have only a small impact on milk supply. The U.K. Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has commissioned a study investigating the determinants of farm-to-
retail price spreads in the UK and several other EU countries during the 1990's for about 90 
products (London Economics, 2004). The report has suggested very little evidence of 
systematic asymmetric transmission in the EU food chains, with possible exception of certain 
dairy products, which have shown very low price transmission. The study also suggested no 
significant evidence in specific countries of systematic higher asymmetric price transmission 
in food chain compared to others, perhaps with the exception of France where farm gate 
and retail food prices did not seem to exhibit a stable relationship over the long run. This 
report has also investigated the impact of the increased concentration in food retailing on 
price transmission. A semi-structural model has been presented to capture the sensitivity of 
price spreads to factors such as cost distribution along the vertical supply chain (from 
farmers to consumers), demand and supply, EU intervention prices under the Common 
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Agricultural Policy (GAP), exchange rates or competitive conditions at the retail market. The 
model has been estimated for four broad categories of products including wheat, red meat, 
poultry, fruit and vegetables. The result is that there are not empirical evidences of 
systematic widening of farm to retail price spreads as a consequence of potentially stronger 
buyer power due to increasing concentration in the food retail sector. In contrast to the 
DEFRA study, a large report on dairy supply chain margins by MDC (2004) argues that over 
the past ten years farm gate prices and total farm to retail margins have tended to reduce, 
but the dairy processor margins have remained fairly constant and retailer margins have 
increased across all products. However, a change in the farm-retail margins does not 
necessarily point to imperfect price transmission and has to be evaluated against the 
development of other input costs. Serra and Goodwin (2013) in revising the literature 
suggest evidences of asymmetries in price adjustment, although the magnitude is not usually 
big, the price changes tend to flow from farm to the other levels and farm prices rarely 
responded to wholesale or retail shocks probably because of the CMO that affect the price 
formation at the farm level. Our research offers a country specific study of vertical price 
transmission for specific products of the dairy chain, rather than an aggregation of products. 
Several dairy product specific chains linked to raw milk are tested at the three vertical stage 
chains (farm-wholesale-retail): Parmesan reggiano, Mozzarella, and Grana Padano, and two 
vertical stage chains (farm-wholesale) for UHT milk and butter. The monthly price series are 
spanning from 2005 to 2014. This paper is structured in the following parts: a descriptive 
part about structural changes followed by the analysis of volatility, and application of the 
Granger-Engel approach to test the hypothesis of cointegration and asymmetry with TVECT. 
Conclusions are drawn from the evidences about market imperfections and suggestion for 





The econometric modelling of the price asymmetries has been extensively discussed by 
Wolffram (1971), Houck (1977) and Ward (1982). Tweeten and Quance (1969) examined 
asymmetric linear response of prices and Wolffram (1971) extended the linear model to 
include asymmetric response to the magnitude of accumulated magnitudes of past change. 
Variations of the Wolffram method have been criticized because ignoring the properties of 
time series: when price series are non stationary, the autoregressive model may suffer from 
specification and would give spurious results (Granger and Newbold, 1974). To avoid such 
problem von Cramon and Taubadel (1998) propose to modify the Wolffram approach by 
allowing the error correction term and Goodwin and Holt (1999) propose to use the  
threshold vector error correction term (TVECM) a multivariate version of the simplest class,  
the univariate Threshold Autoregression or TAR, developed by Tong (1983,1990). Balke and 
Fomby (1997) extended the TVECM to a cointegration framework. The TVECM investigates 
about the adjustment of individual process and provides more information about short run 
price dynamics. Balke and Fomby (1997) use the threshold cointegration and the error 
correction models with a grid search procedure and threshold parameters selected by 
minimizing the sum squared errors (SSE). In this research the price transmission is examined 
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in the Italian Dairy market contest, motivated by a total differential of partial reduced form 
of the downstream prices in terms of upstream prices using a three regime TVECM to 
explore the asymmetric price adjustment and vertical price dynamics. For the simplest case 
of two prices Pft and Pwt: the linear cointegration condition is tested with the following 
equation: 
 
1 -  Pft = m + bPwt + vt  or vt = Pft - m - bPwt;  vt = fvt-1 + ut  and vt ≈ N(0, s2 ) i.e. I(0) 1 
 
Pft and Pwt are two prices at two market levels, the error term vt is the deviation from the 
LR equilibrium distributed as a martingale difference sequence with finite covariance matrix  
cointegration is accepted when vt is I(0). The optimal lag length may be determined 
empirically or by test (correlation, portmanteau), however, results will be sample specific. 
Boyd and Brorsen (1988) examined both a model in levels and one in changes allowing for 
consideration of both response to change in levels and consideration of response to 
magnitude and speed of adjustment to change in prices. Considering a full linear price 
system through the vertical chain, Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, (2004) review 
alternative specifications for such a system. If price time series are stationary, the system is 
represented by VAR that would show the linear responses to change in level of price. In case 
of asymmetric price response the VECM must be estimated. The error correction model is 
motivated by the concept of cointegration: assuming there exists a long run dynamic 
relationship between two variables Pft and Pwt a portion of disequilibrium in SR from one 
period to the next one is corrected with the error vt (Engle and Granger, 1987; Cramon-
Taubedel and Fahlbusch, 1994). Threshold models are based on the principle that the data 
generation process for a time series is characterized by separate regimes, each one with its 
own independent behavior. Goodwin and Holt (1999) use the threshold vector error 
correction model (TVECM) to investigate the adjustment process and provide more 
information about short run price dynamics.        
Xt = t – I: 
 
 2-  DXt = m + S
 
i=1…k-1 Gi DX t - i 
+
 + ab’ X t - k 
 
+ fD t  + et, t = 1…T        
 
where X k+1,..,X0 are determined and e1, ...,eT  for t = 1..T are independent p-dimensional 
Gaussian variables with mean zero and covariance matrix L; Gi
run dynamics of price data. The vector Dt denotes seasonal dummies centered at 
zero, f the seasonal coefficient. The parameters of Gi for i spanning from 1 to k – 1 are 
short-run effects,  t-k are the relevant lags,  m is the constant term, a is the p x r matrix (the 
                                                          
1 In estimation of the threshold parameters, previous analyses are not yet done, and the information 
contained in the variance-
of possible relations among the markets to be considered. Assuming a cross sectional independence 
among residuals, the analysis requires to elaborate a grid search to minimize the the trace test of the 
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adjustment coefficients) and b is the cointegrating coefficient. Note such model is symmetric 
so that the effect of |DX t- i |in absolute value  is the same regardless of its sign. The 
deviation from the long run equilibrium, is the error correction term ECT = b’ X t –k . The model 
above also assumes that the effect of |ECT | is the same regardless of the sign of ECT 
(symmetry condition). For the agricultural commodity prices, Von Cramon-Taubadel and 
Fahlbusch (1994) were among the firsts to incorporate the concept of cointegration into 
models of asymmetric price transmission for agricultural commodity prices. Indeed, as 
Granger and Lee (1989) pointed out, within the general VECM notation above, it may be 
important whether the variable DX t - i is positive or negative or whether ECT is positive or 
negative. Following the notation for a general (random) variable x, let x+ = max {x, 0} and x - = 
min { x, 0} = - max {-x, 0}, then we can write x = x
+
 + x 
-
. In this way, we can write DXt –i in 
deviations: 
 
3 -  DX t -i = DX t -i 
+
 + DX t - i 
-
, where DXt -i 
+
 = max{DXt - i ,0}, DX t - i 
-
 = min{DXt -i, 0}     
 
and the error correction term is: 
 
 4 - ECT = ECT 
+
 + ECT 
-
, where ECT 
+
 = max {ECT, 0}, ECT 
-
 = min {ECT, 0}. 
 
It is noticed that in the context of a VECM, specification is left unsolved by the theory as 
either or both short-run and long run asymmetric response to change in prices could be 
allowed. Balke and Fomby (1997) argued for the latter case. To proceed, we consider the 
general case allowing for both types of effects so the original VECM can be written as: 
 




 DX t - i 
+
 + S i=1…q Gi
-
 DX t - i 
-








+ fD t  + et, t = 
1…T 
 
In figure 1 is reported the three regimes of the error vt following the TVECM linear and non 
linear pattern caused by non linear positive and negative price responses within the 
threshold interval. (see appendix 2).  
 
Figure 1.  Description of the price adjustment with three regimes error correction 
 
Source: our elaboration 
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Referring to equation 5 and figure 1, three different types of asymmetries are observed 
depending on: reaction time, equilibrium adjustment, simultaneous impact and distributed 
lag: 
1 – Asymmetric price transmission outside the symmetric interval c1 = c2; 
2 – Asymmetric Price transmission outside the asymmetric interval: c1≠c2 causing 
different price responses in positive-negative directions (slope of the errors (t); 
3 – Price shocks at different chain level are different and depend on the level at which 
the initial shocks start (Vavra and Goodwin; Goodwin &Holt). 
Assuming Pit, Pjt and Pkt, referred to three prices of the dairy chain: retail, wholesale and 
farm-  signaling the market level; bj is the estimated cointegration 
coefficient between Pjt and Pit; bk is the estimated cointegration coefficient between Pkt 
and Pjt and vt is the positive or negative residual vector of the LR equilibrium relationship 
(i.e the positive or negative deviation from the LR equilibrium) modelled as: Vt = f v(t-d) + et,  
with vt-d ranging in the interval -∞ to +∞. It is possible to define the following types of 
asymmetries: 
i)   If G i 
+
 = G i 
-
  ;  s = q;   a
+ = a -  the VECM is symmetric;  
ii)  If G i 
+
  = G i 
-
  ; s = q;  a
+ ≠ a -  the VECM shows the asymmetry in reaction time (ART) to 
positive and negative price shocks and equilibrium adjustment path (AEAP); 
iii) If G i 
+
  ≠  G i 
-
  the VECM shows the asymmetry in simultaneous (cumulated) impact 
(ACUI); 
iv) If G i 
+
  ≠  G i 
-
   and s ≠ q then the presence of asymmetry in distributed lag effect and 
cumulated impact (ALE and ACUI). 
Note that only simultaneous impact asymmetry is short-run asymmetry, while other types of 
asymmetries are long-run asymmetries. Assuming the X as a vector of prices our notation 
presents a general VECM as considered for the bivariate case by Meyer and von Cramon 
Taubadel. A final notation on specification that deserves consideration follows from the 
possibility of nonlinearity in the relationships. While the VECM in linear form rules out such 
nonlinearity, variation in its specification can accommodate nonlinearity by allowing for 
regime change either exogenously by specification of a parameter shift at point in time or 
endogenously by specification of threshold condition at which a parameter shift occurs. In 
this latter case, the threshold could be specified as an exogenous value, e.g. von Cramon 
Taubadel (1996), estimated as a parameter, or smoothly based on further modeling of 
parameter evolution, e.g. Serra and Zilberman (2013). Azzam (1999) and Goodwin and 
Piggot (2001) provide theoretic motivation for such threshold adjustment mechanisms. 
Granger and Lee (1989) presented an approach for the former type of an asymmetric error 
correction model that was further developed by Enders and Granger (1998), who also noted 
that standard unit root tests are mis-specified if adjustment is asymmetric and presented 
new critical values for unit root tests for use when asymmetry is possible. Clearly, when the 
threshold is zero, the TVECM provides a direct alternative approach to estimation of 
asymmetric VECM. As the TVECM provides a basis for differentiation of price level response 
to change in price level, such impulse responses are typically not examined. Further, an 
important limitation of the TVECM is the need to specify or estimate exogenous threshold 
values. From this perspective, the TVECM provides little other than a regime switching 
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mechanism and, thereby, is most useful when treatment periods are ex ante observable by 
the researcher at least in number of thresholds that might be relevant. In our application, 




Empirical analysis of the dairy chains prices in Italy 
 
The monthly price series 2of some dairy products from 1st Jan 2005 to June 2014 3  are 
examined to observe their evolution, interactions and transmission. In Figure 1, the 
dynamics of monthly prices in the Italian dairy chain are illustrated; for the purpose to 
facilitate the cross price analysis the series are indexed to 100 in the first period. The sample 
covers the period running from 1st Jan 2005 to June 2014. The measure of variability, often 
used in financial market analysis, is the standard deviation of returns, where the return is 
defined as the proportional change in price from one period to the next. The return are  the 
log  difference of prices from one period to the next and measure the unconditional volatility,  
expressed as follows: 
 




  with  rt = ln(Pt ) - ln (Pt-1) and  rm = S 1/n * rt  
 
If prices follow a unit-root process with a multiplicative error term, r will be stationary and its 
standard deviation will not depend on the size of the sample. This unconditional concept 
does not take into account any prior information and is based only on observed variation in 
returns (Minot, 2014). Two general patterns of co-movement exist that appear to be 
consistent with cross-product arbitrage to move milk ingredients into more storable forms. 
The prices of butter, GP, PR, and milk appear to co-move, however the intertemporal timing 
of their co-movement appears to change over time. For example, butter price appears to 
lead changes in milk, GP, and PR price. The extended shelf life of retail UHT and Mozzarella 
relative to other products is reflected in greater stability in their prices. 
Evidence of the extent of price volatility at various stages of the dairy chain follows from 
consideration of intra-year price variation. In Table 1, it is reported the intra-year standard 
deviation of the percentage change in price. While this is based only 12 monthly 
observations each year, results suggest the extent of price variation experienced. As is clear 
from this table, price variation experienced varied across the products and stages, in some 
cases reaching as high as 8% for retail butter in 2009, though more typically falling the 
range of 1-2%. 
The analysis of price proceeds with the following operations. 
First, the stationary condition of the series will be checked using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller test; second, the linear co-integration will be verified using the  Johansen co-
integration test and third the asymmetry will be verified and commented.  
                                                          
2
 As reported by Serra et al., the prices of milk are constant through the month with adjustment being made at 
the beginning of each month. 
3
 Data provided by ISMEA 
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Figure 1. Indexes of monthly farm and retail prices for Italian dairy products 
 
 








PR-W-24 PR-R-24 UHT-R Butter-R  
Mozzarella 
- R 
jan-dec   2005 0.0022 0.01 0.00 0.0109 0.0058 0.0164 0.0078 0.0037 
jan-dec   2006 0.0094 0.00 0.01 0.0035 0.0025 0.0163 0.0155 0 
jan-dec   2007 0.0222 0.0254 0.0081 0.017 0.0035 0.0163 0.1039 0.0202 
jan-dec   2008 0.0255 0.0141 0.0054 0.0089 0.0026 0.02 0.0328 0 
jan-dec   2009 0.0281 0.012 0.0095 0.0186 0.0038 0.0177 0.0827 0.0251 
jan-dec   2010 0.0243 0.0089 0.0055 0.0135 0.007 0.0158 0.0536 0.0102 
jan-dec   2011 0.0056 0.0166 0.0119 0.0074 0.0324 0.0129 0.0277 0.0079 
jan-dec   2012 0.0287 0.0066 0.0038 0.0042 0.0146 0.0128 0.0634 0 
jan-dec   2013 0.0071 0.0205 0.0017 0.0055 0.0201 0.0198 0.0332 0.0213 
jan-dec   2014 0.029 0.009 0.008 0.0084 0.008 0.0347 0.0434 0 
jan-oct 2015 0.0237 0.0181 0.008 0.0151 0.0144 0.0181 0.0587 0.0141 
Average  
month 




Univariate time series properties 
 
The first step is the exam of the univariate properties of the price series. The Augmented 
Dickey Fuller tests suggests that the series are non-stationary in levels, but stationary in first 
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Table 2.  ADF test for stationarity 
 
 
Exceptions may include GP_R where the hypothesis of non-stationary can be rejected only at 
the 10% level. Then we estimate the rank of the cointegrating vector for bivariate pairs of 
prices. In table 2, the estimated rank is one for raw milk and butter, GP_W and GP_R;  
GP_W and PR_R; GP_R and PR_W; GP-R and PR_R;  Butter with Mozzarella; of 29 pairs only 
six appear to be cointegrated. When the series aren’t cointegrated, the price transmission 
between price pairs is not significant. In terms of market efficiency this result appears quite 
surprising given the previous hypothesis that the various steps of the dairy chain are co-
integrated. The lack of co-integration between raw milk and other products can be explained 
with the presence of the OCM,  influencing the price formation quite stable at the farm level 
and not affected by marked conditions; this justifies the separation from the industrial or 
retail level  markets where the price setting is made in competitive conditions. The other 
cointegration between GP_W and GP_R or PR_W and PR_R appear quite plausible due to the 
interactions  among these markets.    
The results about the linear cointegration, suggest to continue to check for non linear 
cointegration using the asymmetric VECM and testing for asymmetry in the long run deviation 
ECT,. It is typical that interest focuses on price asymmetry as the deviations from long run 
equilibrium. It is estimated the later as ECTt in the first step of Granger's two step method. It 
is reported in the first block (Tables 4.1), results for the case where asymmetry occurs only 
with respect to ECTt and in the lower block (table 4.2) for the case of asymmetry  allowed for 
each of the independent variables, both short run and long run indicators. 
 




GP-W GP-R PR-W PR-R UHT Butter Mozzzarella 
Raw milk NA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
GP-W 
 
NA 1 0 1 0 0 0 
GP-R 
  
NA 1 1 0 0 0 
PR-W 
   
NA 0 0 0 0 
PR-R 
    
NA 0 0 0 
UHT 
     
NA 0 0 
Butter 
      
NA 1 
Mozzzarella 
       
NA 
 
Results provide strong support for rejecting the null hypothesis of asymmetry for all bivariate 
pairs, except GP_W and GP_R. For most pairs, the estimated parameters in the asymmetric 
VECM are statistically significant, though the point estimates are close in values leading to 
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rejection of the null. Thus, in general, we infer from available data that price transmission 
within the Italian dairy chain is symmetric.  
 
Table 4.1. Asymmetry in ECT with the assumption that only ECT could be asymmetric 
 Raw Milk GP- W GP- R PR- W PR- R UHT Butter 
Mozzarell
a 






0.346 0.130 0.151 
GP W 0.760 NA 0,026 0.320 0,371 0.133 0.543 0.885 
GP R 0.851 0.455 NA 0.959 0,134 0.404 0.580 0.976 
PR W 0.816 0.014 0,117 NA 0,598 0.202 0.734 0.969 
PR R 0.804 0.553 0,000 0.895 NA 0.451 0.492 0.93 




0.713 0,000 NA 0.800 0.977 
Butter 0.265 0.215 0,182 0.960 0,190 0.926 NA 0.592 
Mozzarella 0.389 0.649 0,485 0.425 0,064 0.621 0.587 NA 
Note: The table above uses Granger two step method. 
 
Table 4.2. Asymmetry in ECT with the assumption that all rhs terms could be asymmetric 
Raw Milk Raw Milk GP- W GP- R PR- W 
PR- R 











0.266 0.150. 0.978 0.842 0.485 
GP W 0.785 NA 0,005 0.828 0,390 0.783 0.200 0.569 
GP R 0.451 0.346 NA 0.964 0,053 0.795 0.092 0.520 
PR W 0.679 0.978 0,167 NA 0,022 0.397 0.233 0.684 
PR R 0.404 0.322 0.173 0.692 NA 0.612 0.940 0.429 
UHT 0.181 0.837 0,109 0.792 0.752 NA 0.928 0.947 
Butter 0.955 0.231 0,960 0.057 0,398 0.911 NA 0.876 
Mozzarella 0.869 0.183 0,944 0.799 0,217 0.953 0.544 NA 
Note: The table above uses MTAR method 
 
The results reported in tables 4.1 ans 4.2 are consistent with a linear VECM then our analysis 
stop at this point. If the relationships were nonlinear, one approach to test for nonlinearity is 
to estimate a threshold VECM where the parameters shift to different values, depending on 
the magnitude of the error relative to a threshold. Tsay non parametric test and sequential 
conditional iterative SUR in two steps of which: first step a two dimensional grid search is 
carried out to estimate the threshold parameter (c1 and c2 see  fig 1 ) by finding  the values 
of the threshold (Serra and Goodwin, 2003).   
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In this paper, it has been examined the efficiency of dairy chain markets in Italy with 
evidences of price transmission using  the econometric approach based on monthly time 
series data. As suggested by Granger and Engel it was estimated the stationarity condition 
and the cointegration among all pair of prices, it was used the lagged errors vt-1 resulting 
from OLS estimates of the first step for the threshold vector error correction term with three 
regimes and finally the dynamics of long run equilibrium were analyzed. The results do not 
support the hypothesis of asymmetries in shocks transmission in the dairy sector4 and from 
the parameter values the transmission occurs rapidly with very limited delays. The Italian 
liquid milk industry is characterized by lower value added to factor costs, limited margins on 
manufactured products, a relatively higher competition among the most relevant retail 
chains due to the number of private labels. These sector features may have influenced the 
transmission from farm to retail prices reducing the asymmetric price adjustment. In addition 
the relative weakness of dairy farm contractual organization may have reduced the strength 
of farm price transmission.  The CMO regulation of the farm prices doesn’t seems to have 
caused  asymmetric vertical price transmission as the lack of cointegrations among the pair 
of prices tested and the reverse, the retail price movement is not reflected in the pass- 
through to dairy farmer prices. The contract bargained with the intervention of farmers and 
industry association has limited as well the asymmetric power between farmers and industry. 
Some asymmetries can be explained with the Ward’s suggestion that asymmetries may be 
related to highly perishable products, in our case it is more reliable the hypothesis that the 
asymmetry could be generated by speculative actions causing overreaction to increasing 
prices. Price shocks induce permanent adjustments in most of the markets however the pass 
through doesn’t seems to be affected by the presence of oligopoly conditions at some dairy 
chain level. The tendency to price reduction at the farm level seems to be caused by internal 
market conditions (growing supply and increasing size seeking for scale economies). The 
CMO protection has probably affected the dairy farms integrated in dairy coops 
countervailing the market power at higher levels. Consequences for policy analysis  can be 
summarized as it follows: if the price transmission is working and evidences of asymmetries 
are limited to few dairy products, the market conditions can be considered quite efficient for 
almost all the dairy products. The decline in price at the farm level are due to a substantial 
increase in market competition that has accelerated the need for structural changes to 
obtain scale economies at farm level accompanied by better integration at different chain 
level to participate to the redistribution of value added of the dairy chain. The milk package 
is offering the measures  to substitute the quota market protection with the increased 






                                                          
4
 These results are in line with those found by Serra and Goodwin for the Spanish dairy market.  
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1. A time series is integrated when it has a mean reverting property and a finite variance. It is only 
temporarily out of equilibrium and is called stationary in I(0). However, a time series, that has to be 
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differenced before it is stationary, has an infinite variance. The series is stationary at a higher order 
I(d), e.g. an I(1) series is stationary at first difference.  
 
1.1 Dickey-Fuller (DF)  
A test for stationarity Dickey and Fuller (1979) referred a unit root test to us which is well established. 
To show the mean contents Alexander (2001) uses an AR(1) model, 
 
 yt = c + ayt-1 +ut  
 
where ût ׽ i.i.d.(0, σ2 ). If |a| < 1 the model is assumed to be stationary and the characteristic 
polynomial of the AR(1) process lies inside the unit circle, otherwise it is nonstationary and the 
variance increases with time. Unfortunately it is not useful to test whether αˆ = 1 and then use a simple 
t-test because they are biased. It is more efficient to take the first difference of an AR(1) process,  
 
Dy = f yt-1 + + ut    where  ϕ = a -1ڄ .  
 
Now one can use a one sided t-test with H0: ϕ = 0 and Ha: ϕ < 0 and compare it with the critical values 
from Dickey and Fuller, because they showed that standard tϕ ratios are biased and that the 
appropriate critical values have to be increased by an amount that depends on the sample size. 
 
 
2. Linear combination and Cointegration  
 
Consider the case of two I(1) variables, yt as dependent and xt as explanatory variable, for simplicity 
without a constant. Generally, if we make a linear combination out of them,  
 
yt = α xt + vt  or  vt = yt - α xt     
 
the combination vt will normally still be I(1), since they both have infinite variance. However, if the 
constant α is therefore such that the bulk of the long run components of yt and xt cancel out, the linear 
combination could be I(0), more precisely, the difference vt would be I(0). If a linear combination of I(1) 
variables is stationary, (i.e vt ≈ I(0)) then the variables are said to be cointegrated. 
 
 The Engle-Granger two Step Approach (1987) suggest a cointegration test, which consists of 
estimating the cointegration regression by OLS, obtaining the residual vt and applying unit root test for 
vt . To test an equilibrium assertion, they propose testing the null that vt has a unit root against the 
alternative that it has a root less than unity. Since vt are themselves estimates, new critical values 
need to be tabulated. Thus one has to use the corrected MacKinnon critical values. We have the 
equation  
 
vt = r vt-1 + εt with εt ׽ (0, σ2) 
 
where vt follows an autoregressive progress and εt is a random variable with martingale process.  
One could assume three possibilities, that ρ is smaller, equal or higher than one:  
1) If | ρ | > 1: yt ~ I(1) and xt ~ I(1) then vt ~ I(2); 
2) If | ρ | = 1: yt ~ I(1) and xt ~ I(1) then vt ~ I(1);  
3) If | ρ | < 1: yt ~ I(1) and xt ~ I(1) then vt ~ I(0).  
 
Only if | ρ | < 1, a cointegration relationship exists. If one wants to derive more information about the 
dynamic behaviour of the variables, he will have to apply an Error-Correction model. Engle and Weiß 
(1983) demonstrated that if a set of cointegrated variables exist, they can be regarded as being 
generated by an Error-Correction model, which is called the Granger Representation Theorem.  
 
Error-Correction model (ECM): Cointegration is concerned with long run equilibrium. On the other 
hand, Granger causality (see below) is concerned with short run forecastability. These two different 
models can be considered in an error correction model. The name error-correction model is derived 
from the fact, that it has a self regulating mechanism. That means it returns after deviations 
automatically to its long run equilibrium. The ECM has a long run equilibrium and uses past 
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disequilibrium as explanatory variables in the dynamic behaviour of current variables.1 One can 
estimate a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) process,  
 
yt = a11yt-1 + a12xt-1 +e1,t  
xt = a21yt-1 + a22xt-1 +e2,t  
 
If one takes the differences of a VAR model, he will receive the Error-Correction model: 
 
Dyt = l1 z t-1 + S i =1, t-1 (c11 Dyt- i + c12 Dxt- i )+ e1,t  
 
Dxt = l2 z t-1 + S i =1, t-1 (c21 Dyt- i + c22 Dxt- i )+ e2,t  
 
with zt = yt −α  xt , which is exactly our residual series and with λ1 ≤ and 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. As one can 
easily see, if yt-1 is too high, yt will be reduced again over  zt – i and λ1. The same holds for xt over  zt – 
i and λ2. However, zt regulates only the long run equilibrium, with λ1 and λ2 as adjustment speed, but 
if one wants to derive information about the short run adjustment, you will have to pay attention to the 
second part of the equation. The ECM shows how significant the lagged variables are, by using simple 
t-tests. If one wants to know, how strong the influences of all lagged values together are, you will have 
to apply a test for Granger. 
 
Appendix 2  
 
APT – TVECT in presence of threshold: three market levels: Pit a – bj Pjt - bk Pkt = vt  
Assuming Pit, Pjt and Pkt are three vertically related prices: retail, wholesale and farm-levels; 
a is the constant signaling the market level;  
bj is the estimated coefficient between Pjt and Pit; bk is the coefficient between Pkt and Pit; 
vt is the positive or negative residual vector of the LR equilibrium relationship (i.e the + or - deviation 
from the LR equilibrium) modelled as: 
vt = (f)vt-1 + ut, ranging in the interval between  - °° to + °°;  
The co-integration condition among the prices requires Vt, to be stationary, i.e I(0) or |f |< 1 implying. 
(Balke and Fomby, 1997). 
This analysis is extended to the case of three regime with Vt following a threshold auto-regression: 







(1)  if - ∞ < v (t-d) ≤ c1 ci and c2 are the threshold parameter values 
that indicate the different regimes; 
Vt-d is the variable relevant to the threshold 
behaviour (often referred the  "forcing variable"). 
In most empirical applications, d is = 1 (see fig. 
before), though this is a restriction can be 




(2)  if  c1 < v (t-d) ≤ c2 
 
f
(3)  if  c2 < v (t-d) ≤ +∞ 
 
 






 D Pt-i + g
 (1) vt-1 + et
(1)
   if - ∞ < v (t-d) ≤ c1  
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 D Pt-i + g
 (2) vt-1 + et
(2)





 D Pt-i + g
 (3) vt-1 + et
(3)
   if
    c2 < v (t-d) ≤ +∞ 
 
where Pt, is the vector of prices being analyzed and Bi and g are vectors of parameters to be 





   DPt 
B
1
 Xt-l +  et
 (1)
   if - ∞ < v (t-d) ≤ c1  
Range Xt – l  
for l= 1..l 
 





 Xt-l  + et 
(2)
    if  c1 < v (t-d) ≤ c2 D Pt-2 
B
3
 Xt-l + et 
(3)
    if
    c2 < v (t-d) ≤ +∞ ..... 
 D Pt-l 
 
B is the matrix of parameters that can be written as: 
DPt = b 
(1)
 X t-l d1t (c1, c2, d) + b 
(2)
 X t-l d2t (c1, c2, d) + b 
(3)
 X t-l d3t (c1, c2, d) +  et 
 
Where the d terms are indicator variables defining each regime 
d1t (c1, c2, d) =  - ∞ < v (t-d) ≤ c1 
d2t (c1, c2, d) =  c1 < v (t-d) ≤ c2 
d3t (c1, c2, d) =  c2 < v (t-d) ≤ +∞  
